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On November 29, 1990 President Bush signed the Immigration Act
of 1990, approving the most overwhelming changes in U.S. immigration
law in forty years. The traditional goal of family reunification remains
the primary focus of U.S. immigration policy, but the number of visas
granted for employment-based immigrants has been increased from
54,000 to 140,000 annually beginning October 1, 1991. This shift in fo-
cus is an attempt to meet the requirements of the U.S. labor market
which needs highly skilled aliens with advanced degrees or extraordinary
ability in the arts and sciences. The most controversial aspect of the new
Act is the creation of a business investor category which grants 10,000
visas to immigrants who invest capital in the amount of a million dollars
in this country, and thereby create jobs for at least ten full-time
employees.
Although the idea of granting visas based on investment has met
heavy criticism in this country, the practice has been common in many
other countries, primarily in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, for a
number of years. All three of these countries have been highly successful
in attracting immigrants, primarily from Asia, through similar systems
of granting visas based on investment. The number of investors taking
advantage of these types of programs has increased significantly since the
British Government announced that Hong Kong would revert to Chinese
control in 1997. Many wealthy Chinese business people have taken ad-
vantage of such programs to move their wealth and their families to a
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more stable environment and have benefitted the immigrating country
with an influx of capital, employment and technology.
The United States decided to update its immigration policy not only
to meet the demand for high-skilled employees in this country, but also
to take advantage of the number of wealthy people looking to emigrate.
It is noteworthy that as the United States' program was finally being put
into effect, the Business Migration Program (BMP) in Australia was be-
ing canceled. This paper is an attempt to evaluate the United States' new
investor program based on a comparison with Australia's failed system.
The thesis of this paper is that in order for an investor program to be
successful, the program must strike a careful balance between meeting
the needs of the immigrant investors and those of the welcoming country
and its citizens. The analysis proceeds by briefly looking at the history of
immigration in both countries and then focusing on what the interests of
the investors and the country are in initiating and taking advantage of
such a program. The paper evaluates the strengths and the weaknesses
of Australia's BMP in an attempt to determine what led to its demise,
and then applies its conclusions to the United States' new program in
order to predict its success and to make recommendations for its im-
provement. This analysis demonstrates that the Australian system failed
because it was too focused on meeting the needs of the investors, and in
the process failed to uphold a positive public perception of the program.
The U.S. investor program, on the other hand, will be ineffective because
it fails to allow enough flexibility to meet the interests of the investor and
focuses too much on the interests of the United States.
II. AUSTRALIA'S IMMIGRATION HISTORY
Australia's colonization began in 1788 with the first arrivals of Eng-
lish convicts and their jailers. The use of Australia as a penal colony
continued for a number of years. Eventually, organized migration and
settlement programs began to arrive from England, Ireland, Scotland
and Wales. The 1850's gold rush attracted immigrants from all over the
globe, particularly from China, which prompted a desire by the Euro-
pean settlers to begin controlling immigration. In fact, the desire to con-
trol immigration was one of the primary reasons why the Australian
states joined together in a federation in 1901.1 One of the first statutes to
be enacted by the federation was the Immigration Restriction Act of
1901.
The Immigration Restriction Act became known as the "White
1 Patricia Hyndman, Australian Immigration Law and Procedures Pertaining to the Admission




Australia Policy" because it forced immigrants to take a dictation test of
not less than fifty words in any European language. Basically this test
excluded any non-white immigrants.' This restrictive policy was in effect
until after World War II when the government finally loosened some of
the tight restrictions. The eventual outcome of allowing immigration to
non-Europeans was the enactment of the Migration Act of 1958.
This Act conferred wide discretionary powers on the Minister of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and has remained in place for the past
thirty years as the main statute controlling immigration. In 1976 the
Entrepreneurial Migration Category or Entrepreneur Program was first
introduced as a push to attract European and U.S. business people to
migrate to Australia. Under this program, a business person required
only minimal evidence of a business background and $A30,000 for trans-
fer to Australia.' This program remained in effect until 1981 when it was
replaced with the Business Migration Program (BMP), which existed un-
til August 1991.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE BUSINESS MIGRATION PROGRAM
The main objective of the BMP was to attract successful business
people to settle permanently in Australia and contribute their expertise
and capital to business ventures that were likely to achieve one or more
of the following: 1) create or maintain employment, 2) introduce into
Australia new or improved technology for the production of goods or
services, 3) produce goods for export, or 4) produce goods or services to
replace goods or services being imported.4 There were four requirements
which an investor had to meet in order to qualify for the BMP. First, the
investor had to provide evidence of having a successful business back-
ground, business skills or technical knowledge. This could be demon-
strated by providing a curriculum vitae and a summary which indicated
the investor's business intentions and how these intentions met the objec-
tives of the program. Second, the investor had to indicate realistic plans
to establish, or take part in a business in Australia that would meet the
objectives of the program.
The third requirement was to transfer to Australia personally owned
and unencumbered business capital as follows: 1) applicants aged thirty-
2 Id.
3 Michael Bonney, Economic Migration: What is the Likely Net Cost Benefit to Australia?, 64
LAW SOc'Y J. 63, 65 (1990).
4 DEPT OF IMMIGRATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS, BUSINESS MIGRA-
TION PROGRAM: PROCEDURES ADVICE MANUAL § 2.1 (2d ed. Mar. 1990) [hereinafter PROCE-
DURES ADVICE MANUAL].
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nine years and under, $A350,000'; 2) applicants aged forty to fifty-seven
years, $A500,0006 ; and 3) applicants aged fifty-eight years and over,
$A850,000'. Finally, the investor had to show additional personally
owned and unencumbered funds and assets to cover settlement costs. If
an applicant intended on settling in Sydney or Melbourne, he or she
needed a minimum of $A150,0008 . If he or she intended on living any-
where else in the country, the required minimum amount was
$A100,000. 9
Prior to 1988, the application process was quite straightforward.
An interested investor would make preliminary inquiries with either a
lawyer, an accountant or a migration agent who would prepare an appli-
cation and then submit it to the Department of Immigration, Local Gov-
ernment and Ethnic Affairs, (DILGEA). Based on DILGEA's
assessment, the candidates would be approved based on whether they
had met the objectives of the program. In November 1987, the Minister
of DILGEA announced that as of January 1, 1988, a scheme would take
effect to accredit agents not only to prepare applications, as previously
done, but also to carry out the departmental assessment of those applica-
tions. 10 This was done in order to handle more quickly the large amount
of applications. It is appropriate at this time to explain the accredited
agent scheme since the United States has nothing similar to this type of
program.
Accredited agents were persons or companies that entered into a
contract with the DILGEA for the purpose of attracting and counselling
prospective applicants under the BMP. The Accredited Agent Scheme
(AAS) was introduced as a self-financing means of providing counselling
services and assessing applications for business migrants.1 The system
was self-financing because the agents would enter a twelve month renew-
able contract with the government under which the agent was required to
(1) pay $A4000 to the government in consideration of the use of the
BMP logo, and (2) an additional $A500 for each application submitted
on behalf of a clieltt.12
In order to be eligible for agent accreditation the person or company
5 Approximately $259,000.00 in U.S. dollars using the exchange rate as of January 13, 1992.
6 Approximately $370,000 in U.S. dollars as of January 13, 1992.
7 Approximately $629,000 in U.S. dollars as of January 13, 1992.
8 Approximately $110,000 in U.S. dollars as of January 13, 1992.
9 The amount in U.S. dollars would be approximately $74,000 as of January 13, 1992.
10 Paul Baker, Business Migration, LAW INST. J. at 833, 833 (Sept. 1988).
11 PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, JOINT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC Ac-
COUNTS, REP. No. 310, § 6.5 (June 1991) [hereinafter REP. No. 310].




had to be registered in Australia, have effective control of the agency, be
an Australian citizen, be professionally qualified and be able to assess the
business background and viability of the applicant, be of good character
and be registered to act as a migration agent under the terms of Division
VI of the Migration Act 1958.13 Prior to 1988, the agents were strictly
involved in counseling the applicants and preparing the applications to
be submitted to the DILGEA. The rationale behind allowing accredited
agents to perform the actual assessment of the applicants was that this
system would be quicker and that the accredited agents were more likely
to predict the success of the investor's business because the agent had a
business background. 4 Technically, the DILGEA was supposed to
make the final decision on each applicant, but many critics of the accred-
ited agent system have suggested that DILGEA acted merely as a rubber
stamp. As explained in greater detail below, the Accredited Agent Pro-
gram was one of the reasons that the BMP failed. In its attempt to make
the process as easy and quick as possible for the investor, the Australian
government failed to take precautions that would protect the interests of
the country.
IV. THE DEMISE OF THE BMP
On July 25, 1991, the Minister for Immigration, Local Government
and Ethnic Affairs announced that as of August 2, 1991 the Business
Migration Program would be discontinued. The question to be answered
is why, if the program was so successful in attracting foreign capital into
the country, was it considered a failure? The answer is that although the
program met the needs of the immigrant investors (discussed in Part A,
below), it did not meet the needs and best interests of the Australian
people (discussed in Part B, below).
A. The BMP Met the Needs of the Immigrant Investors
In explaining why the BMP did meet the needs of the immigrant
investor, the first step is to look at what the typical immigrant investor is
looking for when he or she decides to emigrate. These needs and inter-
ests may be arranged into four main categories: 1) a stable economic and
political structure, 2) a sustainable market for their product or business,
3) a comfortable social environment, and 4) a low risk/reward analysis.
The first category is quite obvious. Most investors who are inter-
ested in emigrating do so because they fear the instability of their native
13 Baker, supra note 10, at 833.
14 Id.
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country's political or economic situation. The perfect examples of this
are the Hong Kong citizens who are emigrating en masse based on their
apprehensions regarding the political and economic climate after the
transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese control.
The second category is also a fairly obvious interest of an investor.
A successful business person will look for a country in which he or she
will either have a market for his or her product or service, and where he
or she will have the natural resources available to produce the product.
Some factors to be considered in determining whether or not a country
meets this requirement is whether there is a growing population, whether
the country has an abundance of natural resources, whether there are
skilled laborers available to work in the investor's particular industry or
business, and whether there is an abundant supply of this type of indus-
try or business in the country already.
Third, an investor will look at the social environment of the country
to which he or she is considering immigrating. Will the investor feel
comfortable with the culture? Will the people of the country welcome
the immigrant investor or will they resent the investor's presence? These
questions are crucial when considering whether an investor will want to
relocate his or her children and spouse to the new country.
Finally, an immigrant will consider whether the possible rewards
involved in investing in a foreign country outweigh the possible risks im-
posed by the immigration requirements. If the rewards are high and the
risks low, an investor will quickly look to emigrate to this country. If the
rewards are high and the risks are also high, the investor will probably
refrain from emigrating to this country; as will the investor if the rewards
are low, regardless of whether the risks are high or low. This benefit/risk
analysis varies greatly from country to country depending on the require-
ments of the program. The investor will look at a number of factors: the
restrictiveness of the investment requirements, whether the conferred
residency status is conditional or permanent, the autonomy of the inves-
tor's business, and the consequences if the investor cannot meet the speci-
fied requirements of the program. These factors are all crucial factors
which the investor must weigh before deciding where to emigrate.
Based on these categories, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that
the Business Migration Program met the needs of the immigrant inves-
tors. This paper focuses primarily on an analysis regarding the last cate-
gory because Australia and the United States have a fairly similar work
force, political structure, economy and society. Australia is a country
with a fairly stable economy and political structure. It is also a country
with an abundance of natural resources, particularly mineral and ore de-
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posits. In addition, Australia is a growing country with an educated
work force. The interesting comparison here is the risk/reward analysis
because this category is the one in which Australia and the United States
greatly differ.
The rewards under the BMP were great in comparison to the
amount of risk involved, and thus the program was successful in meeting
the needs and interests of immigrant investors. The program's greatest
strength was its flexibility regarding the minimum investment require-
ment and other goals of the program. The Australian program recog-
nized that younger entrepreneurs normally do not have the amount of
available capital that older investors do, yet the program appreciated the
fact that these younger, energetic business people were the type of indi-
viduals that the country was seeking. Therefore, the program included a
graduated minimum investment requirement based on age."5
There was also no requirement regarding the creation of employ-
ment even though the creation or retention of jobs was one of the objec-
tives of the program. This was because an investor had the option of
meeting one or more of the four objectives of the program. If the busi-
ness venture would not create or retain employment, the visa would still
be granted if the venture would introduce new or improved technology,
stimulate exports, or replace imports. 6 This gave the program a large
amount of flexibility. For example, if the immigrant wanted to invest in
a company that was already established in Australia and the investor had
new and improved technology that would help to reduce imports in that
industry, the venture would be allowed even though no new jobs would
be created. In the long term, the goals of providing new technology and
reducing imports should be as valuable to an economy as creating new
employment. Thus, this type of venture was not prohibited simply be-
cause it failed to meet one of the objectives of the program.
The program also contained little risk to the investor because the
investor was given permanent residency status as soon as the funds were
transferred to the country. There was no conditional period where the
investor had to prove that the venture would be successful before the
government granted permanent residency. The investor was not at risk
that he or she would invest the minimum amount ($A350,000,
$A500,000 or $A850,000) and then fail to be given permanent residential
status because he or she had failed to meet another requirement of the
program.1 7 There were also no civil or criminal penalties brought against
15 PROCEDURES ADVICE MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 3.1.
16 Id. at § 2.1.
17 Id. at § 5.2.15.
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the investor if the funds were not invested as indicated in the proposal, or
if it was proven that the funds had come from an illegitimate source. If
fraud was detected, the immigrant was simply deported.
Once the venture had been approved and the visa granted, the inves-
tor was given autonomy regarding how the venture should be imple-
mented, subject of course to Australian rules and regulations. This gave
the investor the freedom to establish the company as he or she wished
without government intervention or surveillance. (As will be mentioned
later, this was also one of the main problems with the program.)
In addition to the great amount of flexibility which decreased the
amount of risk involved for the investor, the large number of individuals
who took advantage of the program suggests the program's success in
meeting the needs of the immigrant investors. Up to and including fiscal
year 1988-89, a total of 6,637 principal applicants from over sixty coun-
tries entered Australia under the Business Migration Program, bringing
with them 19,920 dependents.18 These investors transferred over $3.3
billion since the beginning of the program.19 From July 1989 through
May 1990, 3,138 applications were lodged and 2,272 visas were issued to
investors.20 These investors brought with them 9,456 dependents, 1 and
were expected to transfer almost $2 billion into Australia.22 The major-
ity of the visas went to individuals from Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indo-
nesia.23 The fact that so many people took advantage of the program
suggests that it met the needs of those individuals seeking to emigrate.
B. The BMP Did Not Meet the Needs of the Australian Public
If the program was so successful in meeting the investors' needs,
why was it canceled? This question relates to the second part of the the-
sis that a program is only successful if in addition to meeting the needs of
the investors, it also meets the needs of the country and its people. The
Australian Business Migration Program failed to meet the needs of the
Australian people and thus was canceled. Presently, the Australian legis-
lature is attempting to put together a new program that will meet both of
these crucial requirements.
18 Gregory M. Clement, Note, The New Job-Creating Investor Visa Category: Legitimate Spur to
Investment or a Sell-Off of U.S. Citizenship to the Highest Bidder?, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 195, 224 n.186 (1990).
19 Id. at 224.
20 Austrade-IBA Profile Australian Industry for the Potential Business Migrant, BUSINESS MI-
GRANT (Official Journal of the Australian Migration Consultants Ass'n), at 8, 8 (Aug. 1990) [herein-
after BUSINESS MIGRANT].
21 Id.
22 Bonney, supra note 3, at 66.




The first question is, what are the needs of the Australian people?
There are two main goals which the people of any country consider when
regulating immigration policies: the enhancement of economic conditions
and improvement of social conditions. Immigration improves or benefits
a society by reuniting families, providing diversity of cultures, and pro-
viding a sense of goodwill among citizens by allowing refugees from im-
poverished or totalitarian nations into their country. Immigration
improves economic conditions by recruiting highly skilled individuals.
These skilled employees increase efficiency and technology in the affected
industries, thereby increasing the profits earned in these industries and
generating new capital. In addition, immigration creates an influx of
capital into the country because the immigrants often bring with them
large amounts of money and other assets. This influx of capital often
creates jobs and reduces imports.
While it is obvious that the BMP provided an injection of capital
into the Australian economy, the program lacked the legitimacy of the
Australian people. Constant allegations of widespread fraud and connec-
tions with organized crime created a general dislike of and apprehension
towards the program.24
There were three main problems with the BMP which created this
general apprehension: the inherent conflict in the Accredited Agent
Scheme, the lack of adequate follow-up and monitoring of the program,
and the constant state of flux regarding the regulations which controlled
the program.
1. The Accredited Agent Scheme
As the BMP became more popular, the system of accreditation was
introduced as a way of fast tracking applications so that an investor
could get through the immigration process more quickly and efficiently.
As mentioned previously, an accredited Business Migration agent was a
person or company authorized by the Australian Government to act on
the investor's behalf to advise and counsel the investor on how he or she
could make a successful application under the program. In order to
qualify as an accredited agent, the individual or company had to meet
certain requirements and attend a two day, government sponsored course
intended to familiarize prospective agents with DILGEA requirements.
25
The initial hope was that the agents would assist the investor and his or
her family in settling in Australia and establishing his or her business.
Under the accepted procedure, the accredited agent submitted the
24 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at § 7.2.
25 Baker, supra note 10, at 834.
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application for the investor and certified to the embassy or consulate that
the application met the requirements of the program. Applications han-
dled by agents were normally processed more quickly and did not require
any direct contact between the investor and the Australian Government
office.26 The applicants preferred accredited agents over governmental
officials because they provided a whole range of services, including gui-
dance on where and how to set up a business, how to transfer funds to
Australia, tax advice and advice on how to establish a home.27
In return for these services the applicant paid the agent a fee in addi-
tion to the application fee paid to the government. The agent's fee was
discretionary, based on the type of services the agent provided to the
investor.28
When the press began to question the effectiveness of the Migration
Program and the Accredited Agent Scheme in particular, the Govern-
ment authorized an inquiry under the auspices of the Australian Joint
Committee of Public Accounts. Their report concluded that there were
three main problems with the Accredited Agent Scheme: 1) the agents
were delegated authority by the Commonwealth to assess migration ap-
plications, yet the agents were responsible to their clients and not to the
Commonwealth; 2) the scheme was introduced too quickly and was not
well thought-out; and 3) competition developed among agents for clients
due to the overwhelming number of agents.29
a. An Inherent Conflict of Interest
The most apparent problem with the scheme was that it created an
inherent conflict of interest. The agent was paid by the investor for coun-
seling on how to complete a successful application,30 yet the accredited
agents were making determinations about the applicants they counseled.
The government conceded that this was a "basic conceptual flaw in the
AAS."3  The government had delegated its authority in granting visas to
the private sector, yet the private sector agents owed their allegiance to
their clients and not to the Australian Government.
In addition, although it was not intended that decision making on
26 AUSTRALIAN DEP'T OF IMMIGR., Loc. GOV'T & ETHNIC AFF., USING AN ACCREDITED
BUSINESS MIGRATION AGENT (Sept. 1989).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at 48.
30 Hon. Gerry Hand, Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, New
Category for Business Migrants, Media Release July 25, 1991 [hereinafter New Category].
31 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at § 1.18.
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cases certified by accredited agents be one of rubber stamping 2, the sys-
tem was susceptible to exactly that type of abuse. After the agent had
gone through the process of checking on the applicant's business experi-
ence and assessing whether the client had met the objectives of the pro-
gram, it was highly unlikely that the Government would go through the
whole process again. Thus, the agent wielded a great deal of discretion
to determine 1) whether the applicant had a successful business back-
ground, and 2) whether the applicant's intended venture would meet the
requirements of the program. The fact that the agent had such absolute
discretion, combined with the fact that he or she was paid by the inves-
tor, contributed to the perception that the agents were allowing unquali-
fied investors into the country. The agents were profiting from each
investor who was granted a visa and the government had no procedure
for reviewing decisions.
b. The AAS Was Introduced Too Quickly
The second major problem identified by the Committee was that the
program was implemented too quickly and was not well thought-out.
Parliament approved the AAS in August 1987 and implemented the pro-
gram on January 1, 1988.11 The Committee noted that the "brief lead
time prevented the development of a clear concept of exactly how the
AAS was to work."34 This lack of preparation meant that DILGEA was
forced into the uncomfortable position of developing administrative con-
trols over the AAS while concurrently dealing with the administrative
problems which arose when the scheme was implemented."
One example demonstrating the lack of foresight regarding the AAS
is that there were no provisions regarding the sanction or punishment for
an agent who acted improperly. The only punishment provided was that
the agent's contract would not be renewed at the end of the twelve month
period.36 This hardly seems an adequate disincentive to prevent agents
from taking advantage of the BMP for their own personal gain.
c. Competition Developed Among the Agents
Lastly, DILGEA was ill-prepared for the large number of individu-
als and institutions interested in the agent scheme. The Government ex-
pected only fifty or sixty applications for accreditation, but received
32 PROCEDURES ADVICE MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 4.2.4.
33 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at § 6.17.
34 Id.
35 Id. at § 6.18.
36 Id. at § 6.43.
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approximately 350 applications at the introduction of the program.37 In
June of 1990 there were in excess of 240 accredited business migration
agents. Because of the large number of agents involved, it was difficult
for the government to keep an effective watch over them.
The large number of agents also created problems because they were
competing for clients and actively recruiting investors to take advantage
of the BMP. There were three types of accredited agents: 1) those that
used accreditation as a means to obtain other forms of business from the
investor, such as firms of lawyers and accountants who hoped to con-
tinue to work for the investor after they settled in Australia; 2) those that
were experimenting in the migration market to see if potential business
existed; and 3) those that made their living off the BMP as special migra-
tion consultants.38 The agents that fell into the third category comprised
between 10% and 20% of the total number of agents, yet they processed
the majority of the BMP applications.
39
Although the majority of agents were committed to setting and
maintaining high standards, there were frequent attacks and criticism by
the general public for alleged unethical practices by unscrupulous
agents." The Joint Committee reported that the AAS created a situation
in which migrants were favored rather than the national interest.41 The
perception among the general public was that in order to make a profit,
these agents were forced to recruit and approve investors who were not
appropriate candidates under the program. This in turn created a resent-
ment towards the business investors because many Australians felt that
they had entered the country illegally and were receiving the benefits of
living in Australia without contributing anything back to the country.
2. The Lack of Adequate Monitoring Devices
The second problem with the BMP was the lack of adequate moni-
toring and follow-up procedures. The individuals who applied and were
successful in obtaining a visa were given permanent residency status as
soon as the funds were transferred into the country. The system created
a lack of incentive for people to actually invest the money to meet the
goals of the program. As soon as the money came into the country and
the visa was granted, there were allegations of the investors "recycling"
their money back out of the country for investment in other countries.42
37 Id. at § 6.21.
38 Id. at § 6.13.
39 Id. at § 6.14.
40 Bonney, supra note 3, at 66.
41 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at § 6.23.




The Joint Committee Report concluded that "due to the lack of a system
for monitoring the transfer of funds by business migrants before Novem-
ber 1989, the extent of the practice of recycling funds by BMP migrants
could not be determined," but that the Committee was "of the opinion
that recycling of funds out of Australia ha[d] occurred.
'4 3
There were also allegations of investors laundering illegal money
into the country through this program, and accusations that emigres
were involved in the mafia and other organized crime syndicates. In re-
sponse to this attack, the Joint Committee stated that there were only a
"limited number of instances of penetration of the BMP by identified
criminal figures."'  But even if only a small number of criminals had
entered the country under the BMP, this was enough to create resent-
ment on the part of the Australian people regarding the entire program.
These problems occurred because the only organized ongoing evalu-
ation of the program until 1989 was a voluntary survey questionnaire
which the investor was asked to complete and forward to the BMP Sec-
tion, Central Office.45 The purpose of the questionnaire was to evaluate
1) program outcomes against objectives, 2) performance of accredited
agents, and 3) effectiveness of BMP promotion." This voluntary ques-
tionnaire was obviously not effective in monitoring how the investor's
money was being used. In fact, only 50% of the survey forms were ever
filled out and returned.47 It was also not effective in catching fraud
which may have been perpetrated by the agents. Even though the agents
had to be reaccredited every year, it was highly unlikely that an investor
who bribed an agent to certify his application or was involved in some
other type of fraud would voluntarily share this information with the
government when filling out this questionnaire.
Beginning in November 1989, DILGEA tried to take a more active
role in monitoring the BMP by requiring investors who were granted a
visa to sign a document, entitled the BMP Declaration. This document
authorized DILGEA to obtain information relating to the investor's
bank account in Australia for a period of three years from the date the
immigrant took up residence in Australia.48 However, this monitoring
device was inadequate to ensure the integrity of the program. If an inves-
tor was questioned about transfers of money out of his or her account,
the investor could simply explain that the money had been invested into
43 Id. at § 7.28.
44 Id. at § 7.10.
45 PROCEDURES ADVICE MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 7.2.1.
46 Id. at § 7.1.1.
47 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at § 3.27.
48 PROCEDURES ADVICE MANUAL, supra note 4, at 26.
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the business or equipment for the business, etc. It would then be fairly
easy to forge receipts and bills for business expenditures. In addition, it
does not appear that the Australian government consistently used this
device to check up on the program. Only about five percent of all Busi-
ness Migrants' accounts were regularly monitored.49 If random checks
had been done more frequently, this could have led to the correction of
any problems earlier on in the life of the program. This lack of monitor-
ing created the perception that there were no controls over the activities
of the business migrants and further devalued the BMP in the eyes of the
Australian public.5 0
The criteria used to assess whether a candidate would be granted a
visa were also ineffective in determining whether the objectives of the
program would be met. These criteria were highly discretionary and eso-
teric. For example, how does one determine if the applicant had a "suc-
cessful business background"? Should the emphasis be placed strictly on
how profitable the venture was? Or on how many years of experience the
applicant had? If this is the case, how many years experience is ade-
quate? These types of criteria were conducive to fraud because it would
be easy for the investor to falsify his or her work experience, or for the
agent to certify the applicant based on what he or she "felt" was a suc-
cessful business background if the applicant was willing to pay enough.
These issues illustrate the problems inherent in a program which lacked
organized requirements and consistent follow-up and monitoring.
3. The Regulations Were In A Constant State of Flux
The final problem with the BMP, leading to the general distrust by
the Australian people, was that the program regulations were constantly
changing, making it hard for anyone to know the requirements and
guidelines. Again, this created the perception that unqualified individu-
als were being assisted by the program. An example of the constantly
changing regulations is evident from the mess which surrounded the Mi-
gration Amendment Act of December 19, 1989. The changes the Act
created and the renumbering of the Migration Act of 1958 necessitated a
third reprint of the Act which did not come out until mid-February
1990. The final format of the regulations was unknown until early Janu-
ary 1990.51 During the interim period, interested parties were forced to
make sense of the old Act with the aid of the Amendment Act.52 When
49 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at § 1.35.
50 Id. at § 4.41.





the new regulations were finally available, they sold out quicker than
they could be amended. From December 19, 1989 to March 23, 1990,
there were seveni amendments. 3 In addition, the Procedure Advice
Manuals, which were intended to facilitate a practical understanding of
the new legislation, were also subject to the amendments. This required
a group of departmental officers to issue further amendments and at-
tempt to redraft a large proportion of the pamphlets.54 When changes
are occurring this frequently and the government is unable to publish the
new regulations quickly, it is extremely difficult to keep apprised of cur-
rent requirements.
These problems caused by attempting to update the program to
meet the needs of the large number of applicants demonstrate that the
BMP was too successful in meeting the needs of the immigrant investors.
The system became overwhelmed by the number of applicants and was
unable to effectively follow-up on the investors and the accredited agents.
In addition, the regulations, which were constantly changing in order to
try and manage the program, ended up adding to the problem. In the
end, the Australian people felt cheated by the entire program because
they felt that "undesirable" investors were illegally entering their coun-
try. This caused annoyance because the business investors were sup-
posed to have been the cream of the immigrant crop. It also led to
prejudice against anyone in the program including those immigrants who
had made significant contributions to the country and had met the objec-
tives of the program. As the Minister for Immigration, Local Govern-
ment and Ethnic Affairs stated: "[p]ersistent, often ill-informed criticism
has done considerable damage to public perceptions and confidence in
business migration and has placed an unfair stigma on business migrants
already in Australia".5
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Because of these persistent problems with the BMP, the Australian
Joint Committee of Public Accounts was assigned the task of evaluating
the program and making recommendations for its improvement. Based
on its suggestions, a new "Independent/Business Skills" program is in-
tended to go into effect in early 1992.56 Business migrants under this
program will probably be subject to a points test which will include
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 New Category, supra note 30, at 1.
56 Australian Consulate General, Hong Kong, Business Migration to Australia, Media Release,
Aug. 6, 1991 [hereinafter Hong Kong Consulate].
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credit for their business skills as well as their age and English language
skills, and place less emphasis on the transfer of money and capital. 7 In
announcing the wind-up of the BMP, the Government stressed that it
was firmly committed to the concept of "providing a way for business
people to settle in Australia as part of the migration program.""8 At the
same time, the Government announced the termination of the Accred-
ited Business Migration Agent Scheme, as strongly recommended by the
Parliamentary Committee.5 9
It is interesting to note that this Committee also recommended that
conditional visas not be given to migrants entering under the new busi-
ness skills category of immigration. The committee felt that because "no
other category of migration carries with it a conditional status, the impo-
sition of a conditional visa on one particular class of visa would act as a
disincentive.. .and would defeat the purpose of this category of entry".'
This is a completely different approach from the U.S. Government which
is a strong proponent of conditional visas.
VI. SUMMARY OF THE BMP
On the whole, Australia was very successful in attracting foreign
capital into the country under the BMP. Yet the program failed because
the appropriate balance was not struck between accommodating the
needs of the investors and the needs of the country and its citizens. The
program was heavily weighted in favor of the investors while ignoring
some of the basic concerns of the Australian people. The investors who
took advantage of the program were given flexible capital amounts and
business goals in order to qualify under the program. In addition, their
risk was very small because as soon as they transferred the requisite
amount, they were given a permanent visa. The Australian people, on
the other hand, felt cheated by the program because of a common belief
that the investors defrauded the system to gain entry into Australia and
then failed to meet any of the requirements of the program which would
benefit the country.
Even though the program failed, the United States can learn a great
deal about improving its new investor visa category based on a compari-
son with the Australian system. In this way, the United States can avoid
the pitfalls of the BMP, yet take advantage of the success in luring inves-
tors to transfer their capital into the country.
57 Id.
58 New Category, supra note 30, at 1.
59 Id. at 2.
60 REP. No. 310, supra note 11, at § 8.57.
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VII. U.S. IMMIGRATION HISTORY
Until the late 19th century, when prostitutes, convicts and Chinese
immigrants were banned, the United States had a very open immigration
policy.6" In 1924 a national quota system was instituted which favored
immigrants from western and northern Europe.6 2 This quota system
continued with the passing of the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952, which
maintained the National Origin Quota System over President Truman's
veto.6 3 In addition to maintaining certain quotas, the Act listed a
number of ideological reasons for excluding aliens based on their beliefs,
politics and sexuality. The last major immigration reform prior to the
1990 Act was the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The
1986 Act was enacted for the purpose of controlling illegal immigration
by requiring employers to verify within seventy-two hours of employ-
ment that all new employees were authorized to work in the United
States.
VIII. THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990
Unlike the 1986 Act, the purpose of the 1990 Act was to reform
legal immigration." With respect to permanent immigration, the 1990
Act retained family reunification as a major goal, but attempted to
achieve a better balance between family reunification and employment-
based immigration.65 The Act provided a three-tiered immigration sys-
tem: family-sponsored, diversity-based and employment-related. Prior to
this Act, an investor was unable to immigrate to the United States in
order to establish or purchase an existing business. Investors were only
granted visas if there were remaining issuable visas that had not been
granted to preference applicants such as applicants with family relation-
ships. 66 If visas were available, the investor was required to transfer
$40,000 or more into a U.S. business that would employ them as princi-
pal manager and that would hire at least one U.S. worker. 67 In reality,
61 Pamela Cowan & Steve Miller, The Immigration Act of 1990- A World of Possibilities, WASH.
ST. B. NEws, 19 (Mar. 1991).
62 THOMAS ALEINIKOFF & DAVID MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 52 (2d ed.
1991).
63 Cowan & Miller, supra note 61.
64 Charles C. Foster, The New Immigration Act of 1990: Major Reform of Legal Immigration, 28
HouS. LAW. 26, 26 (1991).
65 56 Fed. Reg. 11,705 (1991) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. 655) (proposed Mar. 20, 1991).
66 Gregory M. Clement, Note, The New Job-Creating Investor Visa Category: Legitimate Spur to
Investment or a Sell-Off of US. Citizenship to the Highest Bidder?, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 195, 196 (1990).
67 Id. at 201.
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there was always a shortage of visas. 68
Before this Act, the United States did not actively encourage foreign
investors to emigrate to this country. There are a variety of reasons why
the United States changed its policy. The United States realized that
there is a tremendous amount of wealth in the world that people are
willing to invest. The best example of this situation is the enormous
number of Hong Kong citizens looking to emigrate before control of the
colony switches from Britain to China in 1997. The United States real-
ized it was missing out on the economic benefits as countries such as
Australia, Canada and New Zealand began to actively recruit these
people.
The U.S. government also realized the potential employment crea-
tion which could be realized through this type of program. As immi-
grants invested in the country, jobs would be created benefitting U.S.
citizens. In addition, these investors would bring with them advanced
technology and skills which are essential to the United States if it is to
remain competitive in this ever-increasing technological age.
The 1990 Act increased employment-related immigration from
54,000 slots to 140,000. Five categories were combined under the Em-
ployment-Based Immigrants heading: 1) priority workers (40,000 slots);
2) aliens who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees
or aliens of exceptional ability (40,000 slots); 3) skilled workers, profes-
sionals and other workers (40,000 slots); 4) certain special immigrants
(10,000 slots); and 5) employment-creation immigrants (10,000 slots).69
The main objectives of the employment-creation category were to create
new employment and to encourage the transfer of new capital into the
country.7 °
A. Requirements To Obtain an Investor Visa
In order to obtain an investor visa the immigrant must invest at least
$1 million in capital towards: 1) a new commercial enterprise which the
alien has established, 2) the purchase of an existing business and the reor-
ganization or restructure of that existing business into a new commercial
enterprise, or 3) an existing business such that the investment of the re-
quired amount of capital results in an increase of 40% in either that com-
pany's net worth or number of employees so that the new net worth or
number of employees amounts to at least 140% of the business's pre-
68 Id.
69 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, § 121 (1990).




expansion net worth or number of employees.7
Three thousand of the 10,000 visas in this category are set aside for
qualified immigrants who establish a new commercial enterprise in a
"targeted employment area". A "targeted employment area" is defined
as a rural area or an area which has experienced unemployment of at
least 150% of the national average.72 A "rural" area is defined as any
area not within either a metropolitan statistical area or the outer bound-
ary of any city or town having a population of 20,000 or more.73 If the
investment is made in a targeted area, the Attorney General has the
power to specify an amount less than, but not less than half of, the re-
quired amount. Conversely, if an investment is made in an area that is
not a targeted employment area or is an area with an unemployment rate
significantly below the national average unemployment rate, the Attor-
ney General may specify an amount of capital that is greater but not
greater than three times the $1 million mark. It is important to note that
under the final regulations, the Attorney General authorized the required
amount of capital necessary to invest in a targeted employment area at
$500,0000. 74
In order to qualify for the visa, the investor's venture must also ben-
efit the U.S. economy through the creation of at least ten full-time jobs
for U.S. citizens, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or
other immigrants lawfully authorized to be employed in the United
States, other than the immigrant and the immigrant's spouse or
children.75
The Act also creates special provisions for residents of Hong Kong
who are employees of certain U.S. or U.S. related businesses. Beginning
in 1991, 12,000 additional immigrant visas per year will be available for
Hong Kong Officers who have worked for a U.S. business or affiliate who
meet certain requirements and who have received an offer to work for the
company in the United States. 76 The Act allows immigrant visas issued
to certain residents of Hong Kong after November 29, 1991 to remain in
effect until January 1, 2002.77 This was done in part to prevent a mass
exodus from China until the investors can see how the new government
will manage the colony. This provision has been called an insurance pol-
icy for the Hong Kong citizens because it provides a quick exit if Hong




75 Immigration Act of 1990 § 121 (5)(A)(3).
76 Id at §§ 103, 124, 152, 154.
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Kong's future under Chinese control becomes uncomfortable for
capitalists.7"
B. Application Procedures
The regulations concerning employment-creating immigrants were
finalized as of November 29, 1991. Under these regulations, application
procedures for obtaining an employment-creating visa are quite straight-
forward. The investor must file a petition with the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service Center (INS Center) having jurisdiction over the area
in which the new commercial enterprise is or will principally do business.
A petition under this classification may only be fied by an alien on his or
her own behalf.7 9 The petition must include a fee payable to the INS. In
addition, the petition must include initial evidence to demonstrate that
the petitioner fits the alien entrepreneur classification. This initial evi-
dence can be divided into six categories: 1) evidence of establishment, 2)
evidence of the amount invested or to be invested, 3) evidence of capital
obtained through lawful means, 4) evidence of employment creation, 5)
evidence of the degree of management authority exercised by the inves-
tor, and 6) evidence addressing whether the enterprise will be in a
targeted or non-targeted area. 0
The first category of evidence includes either articles of incorpora-
tion, a partnership or joint venture agreement, a certificate of merger or
consolidation, a business trust agreement, or other similar organizational
documents for the new commercial enterprise.8" Other documentation
which suffices include a certificate showing authority to do business in a
state or municipality. If the business entity does not require any such
certificate, or if the State or municipality does not issue such a certificate,
the investor may submit a statement explaining this fact. 2 Lastly, the
investor may submit evidence that as of November 29, 1990, the required
amount of capital has been transferred and the investment has resulted in
a substantial increase in either net worth or the number of employees or
both. This latter evidence may be in the form of payroll records, stock
purchase agreements or other evidence showing the conveyance of the
funds from the alien entrepreneur to the business.
s3
Under category two, to demonstrate that the petitioner invested or
78 Arsenio Oloroso Jr., New Ticket for Green Card is Money, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUSINESS, Sept.
30 - Oct. 6, 1991, at 1.
79 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, supra note 71, at 60,910.






is actively in the process of investing the required capital, the petition
must be accompanied by at least one of five acceptable documents. The
five documents that meet this requirement are: 1) bank statements show-
ing the amount of money deposited in the U.S. business account for the
enterprise, 2) invoices or receipts showing assets which have been
purchased for use in the enterprise, 3) U.S. Customs Service commercial
entry documents containing descriptions and fair market valuations of
property transferred from abroad for use in the U.S. enterprise or other
similar documents, 4) evidence of monies transferred to the new enter-
prise in exchange for shares of stock, and 5) evidence of any loan or
promissory note, or other evidence of borrowing which is secured by as-
sets of the investor, other than those of the new commercial enterprise,
and for which the investor is personally liable.84 The key element under
this category is that the investor "has placed the required amount of cap-
ital at risk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital placed at
risk."85 The investor must show actual commitment of the necessary
amount of capital.
The third category was added to the final regulations to ensure that
the capital invested came from legal means. It is possible that this provi-
sion was added to the regulations as a precautionary measure against the
money laundering that occurred in Australia through the BMP. This
objective can be evidenced through: 1) foreign business registration
records; 2) corporate, partnership and personal tax returns or any other
tax returns filed within five years with any taxing entity in or outside the
United States by or on behalf of the investor; 3)evidence proving any
other sources of capital; or 4) certified copies of any judgments of all
pending governmental civil or criminal actions involving monetary judg-
ments against the investor from any court in or outside the United States
within the past fifteen years.8 6
Under category four, in order to show that the new commercial en-
terprise will create at least ten full-time positions, defined as a minimum
of thirty-five hours a week in the regulations, 7 the petition must be ac-
companied by either photocopies of Forms 1-9 for ten qualifying employ-
ees (if the employees have already been hired), or a copy of a business
plan showing that due to the anticipated size and nature of the enterprise
at least ten employees will be needed, and the approximate dates (within
the next two years) when the employees will be hired. 8 If the capital has
84 Id. at 60,912.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 60,910.
88 Id. at 60,912.
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been invested in a troubled business, the petition must be accompanied
by evidence that the number of existing employees is being maintained at
no less than the pre-investment level for a period of at least two years. A
troubled business is defined as a business that has been in existence for at
least two years and has incurred a net loss for accounting purposes, equal
to at least twenty percent of the troubled business's net worth prior to
such loss.8 9
To meet the fifth category the petition must include evidence dem-
onstrating that the investor will be actively engaged in the management
of the new commercial enterprise either through day-to-day managerial
control or through policy formulation. This can be shown by a statement
of the title that the entrepreneur will have in the new enterprise and a
complete description of the position's duties, evidence that the investor is
a corporate officer or holds a seat on the board of directors, or if the
enterprise is a partnership, evidence that the investor is engaged in direct
management or policy-making activities. 90
Finally, if the entrepreneur is planning to establish his or her new
enterprise in a rural targeted employment area, the petition must also
include evidence that the new commercial enterprise is primarily doing
business within a civil jurisdiction not located within any metropolitan
statistical area or within any city or town having a population of 20,000
or more.91 If the entrepreneur is investing in a high unemployment area,
the petition must include evidence that the metropolitan area in which
the new enterprise is primarily doing business has experienced an average
unemployment rate of 150% the national average, or a letter from an
authorized body of the government of the state in which the new enter-
prise is located which demonstrates that the political or geographical
subdivision of the city in which the enterprise is doing business has been
designated a high unemployment area.92 The evidence required under
this category is crucial for those investors who want to invest in a
targeted area in order to take advantage of the smaller $500,000 invest-
ment requirement.
The final decision regarding whether the visa will be granted rests
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service; the INS notifies the
investors accordingly.
89 Id. at 60,911.






IX. PREDICTIONS ON THE SUCCESS OF THE ALIEN
ENTREPRENEUR CATEGORY.
The Alien Entrepreneur Category will be unsuccessful because it
does not meet the two-pronged test which bases success on whether the
program 1) meets the needs of the immigrant investor and 2) meets the
needs of the American people. Unlike the BMP in Australia, the new
U.S. program meets the needs of the U.S. people in the sense that fraud
should be eliminated through the use of strict requirements and follow-
up procedure. Thus, it is unlikely that the U.S. citizens will feel the ap-
prehension and distrust of the program which was felt in Australia due to
the perception of widespread abuse of the BMP. In addition, if investors
take advantage of the program, the U.S. will benefit through the influx of
capital and the creation of jobs. The question is whether or not investors
will take advantage of the program.
Again, this question may be answered by looking at the needs or
interests of the immigrant investor broken down into four categories: 1) a
stable economic and political structure, 2) a sustainable market for their
product or business, 3) a comfortable social environment, and 4) a low
risk/reward ratio. Most people would agree that the United States meets
the requirements of the first three categories. Consequently, this analysis
focuses on the fourth category, the risk/reward ratio, which discourages
immigrant investors from emigrating to this country under this program.
A. Risks to Potential Investors
In analyzing their risk/reward ratio before deciding whether to emi-
grate to the United States, a majority of investors may feel that the risk is
too high in comparison with the possible rewards. There are four major
disincentives to the investor that is considering taking advantage of the
new U.S. program: 1) the required investment amount is very high, 2) the
requirements to meet the objectives of the program are narrow, 3) the
required creation of ten jobs is restrictive and expensive, and finally, 4)
the monitoring devices are very strict.
First, there is currently an investment requirement in place of at
least $1 million. The Attorney General has decreased the amount to
$500,000 in areas with extreme unemployment or rural areas, but this
scenario includes further problems for the investor which are beyond the
scope of this paper. On the whole, the requirement that an investor must
transfer $1 million dollars fails to take into account the huge number of
entrepreneurs who are talented, motivated, and hard-working, but who
are younger and have not been able to accumulate $1 million dollars
which can easily be transferred. Those individuals who can afford to
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transfer the minimum amount may simply feel that it is safer to go to a
country such as Australia or Canada where the requirements are lower,
for the simple reason that if given the option it is better to invest less than
more, especially if the enterprise is risky.
Second, the program may also be considered too risky because the
requirement of investing $1 million dollars in capital fails to take into
account that there are many more ways to meet the objectives of the
program, e.g. to create employment and to create an influx of capital into
the American economy. The regulations define capital as "cash, equip-
ment, inventory, other tangible property, cash equivalents, and indebted-
ness secured by assets owned by the alien entrepreneur, provided that the
alien entrepreneur is personally and primarily liable and that the assets of
the new commercial enterprise upon which the petition is based are not
used to secure the indebtedness."93 Some items that were not included in
the definition of capital were copyrights, trademarks and patents. Be-
cause the regulations specifically list tangible items under the definition
of capital, one can assume that intangible items such as intellectual prop-
erty are not included. This is unfortunate because it would seem that an
investor who can only invest $500,000 but has valuable patents in, for
example, computer software, should qualify under the investor provision
because this type of individual could greatly enhance the U.S. economy.
Due to the million dollar requirement, investors with valuable intangible
assets but little cash will not come to this country; rather, they will take
their knowledge and experience elsewhere where they will create jobs and
increase technology.
Third, investors may also see the requirement that their commercial
enterprise create ten full-time jobs as overly restrictive. For example, if
an investor wants to create a small manufacturing firm which would only
employ seven people, he or she will look elsewhere. This seems contra-
dictory to the goal of the program which is to create new jobs. One
would think that it is better to create seven jobs than no jobs, but this is
exactly what will happen if investors are not sure whether their enter-
prise will sustain ten full-time employees. The other goal of the program
is to create an influx of capital into the country, yet this too may be
discouraged based on the ten person requirement. There may be many
cases of investors who want to put their money into existing U.S. compa-
nies because they have new and improved technology which would
greatly increase the competitiveness of the company, yet would not re-
quire new employees. The entrepreneur cannot do this if the technology
93 Id. at 60,910.
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and investment will not create ten new jobs. This is a clear case of the
U.S. economy losing out due to overly restrictive requirements.
Finally, the established monitoring devices to control the program
are very strict and thus very risky for the potential investor. The harsh-
est requirement and one that will be a significant deterrent for investors
considering emigration to the United States is the conditional residency
requirement. After an alien entrepreneur is approved for a visa, he or she
is given "permanent" residence on a two year conditional basis. During
a ninety day period immediately preceding the expiration of the two year
period, the alien is required to fie a petition with the Attorney General
confirming that the Act's requirements have been met and requesting the
removal of the conditional nature of the residence status.94 At the same
time, the investor must schedule a personal interview with an officer or
employee of the INS to explain how he or she has fulfilled the program
objectives.95 Failure to comply with the objectives and requirements of
the category will result in deportation of the investor and the investor's
family. This conditional status is the strongest monitoring device of the
investor category. However, with the $1 million requirement, potential
investors may be reluctant to gamble their money on a conditional visa.
In addition, if the Attorney General finds at any time before or after
the investor requests the removal of the temporary status that the estab-
lishment of the commercial enterprise was done to evade the immigration
laws of the United States or if the enterprise was never established or the
required capital was never invested, the permanent resident status of the
alien and his family will be terminated. Furthermore, fraud could be
punished through imprisonment of up to five years, fines in accordance
with Title 18, United States Code, or both.96
It is not yet clear what will happen to the investor's capital if at the
end of the conditional period he or she is to be deported. Will the inves-
tor be allowed to sell the commercial enterprise and take the money
when leaving the country? What if the investor makes a good faith effort
to meet the objectives of the program yet the enterprise fails? Will this
person be forced to leave the country with no money to establish a new
start elsewhere? These questions have been considered and even though
the final regulations do not address these issues, there appears to be a
consensus that the INS will have some flexibility in allowing extra time
for the investor to turn the company around or allowing the investor to
94 Immigration Act of 1990 § 216A.
95 Id.
96 Immigration Act of 1990 § 275.
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stay if a good faith effort can be shown. 97 This conditional status will
ultimately have the effect of discouraging many investors from coming to
this country because the venture will be considered too risky.
B. Criticisms of the Program
There seem to be two major criticisms against the Alien Entrepre-
neur Program in the United States. The strongest criticism was articu-
lated by Congressman John Bryant (D-TX) who stated that the provision
was simply "selling American citizenship to the highest bidder."98 This
view was also stated by Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA) during a
keynote address:
I am especially unhappy, I must tell you, with the notion that in this vast
world of ours, one of the things we in the United States should do, is to let
some people buy their way in ahead of others. I particularly dislike the
notion of an economic buy-in to immigration. I'm willing to accept invest-
ment from people who will invest because they think it makes sense for
them to invest here. But allowing people to buy their way into American
citizenship doesn't strike me as very attractive morally.99
Another complaint, based along the same lines, is that the provision
is a repudiation of the U.S. values of opportunity based on merit and
effort. 1" The theory is that the United States was founded by people
who came here with nothing in order to start a new life, and thus it goes
against our basic philosophy to give preference to certain people because
they are able to invest $1 million dollars. Part of the problem stems from
the fact that, at the same time the country is granting 10,000 visas to
wealthy investors, the Act lowers the number of low-skilled immigrants
who can enter the country legally. 101 This change will have an immedi-
ate impact upon the number of poor Central American immigrants who
flock to the U.S. border each year. These people tend to have a long wait
for legal status in this country and this reduction in the number of low-
skilled immigrant visas will make their wait even longer, perhaps up to
six years. 102 Lawyers who deal with Central American immigrants fear
that their clients may grow discouraged and abandon their quest for U.S.
citizenship or attempt to enter the country illegally. 103
97 Leo M. Garonski, Immigration Act of 1990 Encourages Entrepreneurs to Create Jobs in US.,
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C. Strengths of the Program
Although the criticisms voiced in opposition to the program are
compelling, there are two sides to the controversy. The Alien Entrepre-
neur category finally allows wealthy investors, who have been discrimi-
nated against for a number of years in favor of low-skilled immigrants
with family relationships in this country, a chance for a permanent visa.
Since 1978 it has been impossible for an investor to qualify for a perma-
nent visa because these visas were always taken up by immigrants in the
preference categories." Equitably, it would seem that no group of peo-
ple in any economic class should have such a monopoly on immigration
that another group of people can be effectively eliminated from the immi-
grant pool.
It should also be stressed that it is quite possible for immigration to
serve economic as well as humanitarian interests in the United States.105
Many people in the United States erroneously believe that immigration is
an all or nothing situation. It is important that immigration serve both
the needs of the immigrants and the needs of the citizens already in that
country. Economic viability, which the investor provision can improve,
should be a main concern in formulating immigration policy given that
economic stability is one of the reasons that immigrants try to enter the
country.
Another positive aspect of the Alien Entrepreneur visa is that if in-
vestors take advantage of it, it will be an effective way to create jobs for
U.S. workers. This is especially important in the current recession.
These investors will have a stake in guaranteeing that their commercial
enterprise will create employment. Under the established regulations,
they will be deported if they fail to meet this requirement. The fact is
that these investors will have to be motivated, disciplined and work very
hard in order to be successful in the U.S. market.
X. SUMMARY OF THE INVESTOR PROVISION
This new addition to U.S. immigration law will not be effective be-
cause, similar to the BMP in Australia, it does not achieve a balance
between the interests of the immigrant investors and the American peo-
ple. The legislature, perhaps in trying to avoid some of the pitfalls that
other countries had with their investor programs, made the requirements
far too restrictive and inflexible. Thus, the program is protected against
fraud and dishonesty, but it is unlikely that many investors will take ad-
104 Clement, supra note 18, at 195.
105 Cowan & Miller, supra note 61 at 19.
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vantage of it anyway. The risks involved to the investor are too great for
the possibility of a permanent visa and possible penalties if the commer-
cial enterprise is not successful. This is unfortunate because if the pro-
gram would bring in foreign investors, the U.S. would benefit greatly
through the creation of employment, new technology and new ideas.
The main goal seems to be striking a balance between upholding suffi-
ciently strict requirements and follow-up procedures so that U.S. citizens
will support the program, and loosening the requirements enough so that
entrepreneurs will be able and willing to take the risk to come to the
United States.
XI. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS BASED ON A COMPARISON
WITH THE BMP
If the United States is serious about attracting foreign investors, it
can learn many lessons from the failed Business Migration Program in
Australia. The United States must act quickly since other countries, pri-
marily Canada, New Zealand and Australia, have a huge head start.
From the success that Australia and other countries have had in at-
tracting foreign capital, it is obvious that there are many investors willing
to emigrate to countries where the political and economic conditions are
stable. Unfortunately, based on the experiences in Australia, it is equally
obvious that there are individuals who will try to use an investor visa
program as a means of entering a country illegally. The goal is to attract
foreign investors who are sincere in their desire to create a commercial
enterprise that will increase employment and benefit the United States'
economy and to deter those who would simply use the program fraudu-
lently to obtain a permanent visa.
The first improvement which must be made in the U.S. program is a
decrease in the investment requirement. Australia's system of varied in-
vestment requirements based on age is a better system. The Australian
program increases the capital in the economy while allowing entry for
young, aggressive entrepreneurs who do not possess $1 million dollars
yet have the ability to help develop business skills and technology
throughout the next generation. It seems hypocritical that current regu-
lations allow and encourage the granting of visas based on investment,
but those same regulations are so restrictive that they make the cost of
obtaining a visa prohibitive for most people. The fact that only seventy-
two people as of September 7, 1991 have applied for an investor visa
implies that many investors find the requirements too restrictive,10 6 espe-
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cially since these same investors can go to other countries where the in-
vestment requirement is much lower and the living conditions are quite
similar.
The fact that the Attorney General has decreased the required in-
vestment amount in targeted employment areas to $500,000 does not go
far enough to attract investors to come to the United States. It seems
unlikely that an investor would want to undergo this higher risk by com-
ing to the United States and investing in an area that has an unemploy-
ment rate that is 150% higher than the national average or in an area
that is not within the boundary of a town having more than 20,000 peo-
ple. This provision does little to attract the young entrepreneurs who
have the potential to contribute to this country.
Another improvement would be to alter the minimum number of
people who must be employed full-time. This could be done in a variety
of ways. First, the government could allow variations based on the type
of commercial enterprise the investor is going to establish. For example,
if an investor wishes to establish a manufacturing company, then the
minimum number of jobs could remain at ten because manufacturing
tends to be labor intensive. On the other hand, if the investor wishes to
set up a consulting firm, or a small store, then the minimum amount of
employees could be set at five. This suggestion is based on the assump-
tion that the primary goal of the provision is to create employment for
U.S. citizens.
Second, the requisite number of employees could be set at a lower
number initially while the commercial enterprise is being established; af-
ter the two year period expires, the number could increase to ten. This
would lessen the financial pressures on the investor during the first two
years. The current regulations require either copies of 1-9 Forms, if em-
ployees have already been hired, or a business plan showing that ten em-
ployees will eventually be hired within the two year conditional period.
It would take financial pressure off the investor if he or she were given a
two year grace period in which there was no minimum employee require-
ment. Two years should be an adequate amount of time for the investor
to get the enterprise up and running at its capacity. After this period, the
ten employee requirement could go into effect.
Assuming the first two improvements are made, the United States
should maintain the conditional status of the visa and the tight follow-up
procedures. Regular and organized follow-up is the most effective way to
eliminate sham enterprises, but flexibility should be allowed in those
cases when an honest investor has made a good faith effort to create a
successful enterprise but has nonetheless failed. For these type of situa-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:209(1992)
tions it is essential that there are clear definitions of what constitutes a
good faith effort. There should also be specific guidelines defining what
penalties will be brought for failure to comply with the objectives of the
program.
On the whole, the U.S. investor provision is much more effective in
meeting the needs of the U.S. people than the BMP was in meeting the
needs of the Australian people. The tighter control and follow-up will
ensure that fraud will be kept at a minimum. In addition, the opportu-
nity for bribery to occur when assessing the applications is far less likely
under the U.S. system because it has no program like the accredited
agent program that existed in Australia. All petitions in the United
States must go through the INS, and although there is always a chance
that someone along the way could be dishonest, the system is not condu-
cive to bribery like the Accredited Agent Program. Under the U.S. sys-
tem, there are no inherent conflicts of interest between the decision-
maker and the investor.
XII. CONCLUSION
If the U.S. Government is serious about attracting foreign capital to
the United States in order to create employment opportunities, the inves-
tor provision must be amended to decrease the investment requirement of
$1 million. In addition, the employment creation requirement of ten peo-
ple must, at least initially during the two year period when the commer-
cial enterprise is being established, be decreased.
An effective and successful U.S. investor provision would combine
the flexible and realistic Australian admittance requirements, but keep
the strict follow-up and monitoring requirements in place. This combi-
nation would encourage investor emigres to invest in this country, yet
ensure that the program is not abused. In this way the program would
meet the needs of the investors as well as the needs of the U.S. people.
Under these circumstances, everyone benefits and the program will be
successful.
